Special Standing Committee

[Mr. George Stevenson in the Chair]

Adoption and Children Bill

Clause 96 - Appeals

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 134, page 51, line 21, after 'camera', insert 
', except where the judge deems it to be in the public interest to make all or part of the proceedings public and, in all cases so deemed, the child's identity shall be protected.'.—[Mr. Loughton.]
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

George Stevenson: I remind the Committee that with this we are taking amendment No. 10, in page 51, line 21, at end add—
'(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), any proceedings may be reported subject to the following conditions— 
 (a) the name of any adult or child involved in the proceedings must not be reported; 
 (b) no place other than that of a local authority may be reported; 
 (c) the name of any school or other institution, the naming of which might reasonably be expected to make possible the identification of any adult or child involved in the proceedings, must not be reported.'.

Rosie Winterton: It is a great pleasure that you are the Chairman, Mr. Stevenson, in my first afternoon sitting as a Minister on a Standing Committee.
 This morning, we were discussing amendments to clause 96. I was in the midst of saying that I hoped that Opposition Members took my point that many of the cases that they mentioned would apply to the criminal courts, whereas clause 96 applies only to the civil courts. I was saying also that there might be some room for improvement in the drafting of clause 96. However, before I set out where I think that might be, I should explain a little more about the confusion reflected in the amendment. 
 There is a difference between who is allowed into a court and what is reported about court proceedings. The current rule is that only the High Court can allow the public to be present in court during an adoption case. The Bill maintains that position. The current practice is that the High Court tends not to allow the public to be present to hear evidence from, for example, the family, social worker, guardian or psychiatric experts, because it preserves the principle that the child's welfare and privacy should be respected. I am sure that all Committee members will appreciate that witnesses in such circumstances are asked to give evidence about painful and sensitive topics. We feel that to have an open court would not be appropriate, and I hope that other hon. Members agree. However, the High Court gives all or part of its judgment in an open court when it feels that that is in the public interest. Some cases might involve part of the judgment being given in open court and the rest given in private, and many of the details of individual children would be in the latter part. 
 It may help to give some examples of when a judgment would be given in open court, as it may touch on some of the points raised by Opposition Members. A judgment could be given in open court when it raises issues of public interest, perhaps issues about the behaviour of a local authority or an adoption agency that has failed in its public duties because of the circumstances of the adoption; or there could be an issue about the state of the law, for example, if the judge feels that the law is confusing or has not been properly enforced and that it is in the public interest to have that part of the judgment heard in open court. However, if the judgment is given in open court the judge will use initials in respect of the child and the parents and usually the local authority so that anonymity is preserved. That judgment is subsequently reported in the law reports. 
 In a recent case involving care proceedings, the judge named the local authority when criticising it in the judgment in open court. It has to be said that judgments in open court in connection with the Bill would be more unusual because adoption proceedings tend to focus on whether a child should or should not join a new legal family and it is quite unusual for that to be a matter of public interest. In the same way, some of the cases the Opposition Members have—quite rightly—raised would not necessarily be covered under the Bill because it relates specifically to adoption proceedings. 
 We believe that it is right that only the High Court should be able to sit in open court, because the High Court tends to deal with issues of genuine public interest and concern, which makes the open court approach more suitable. I should also say that the rules also allow for a transfer of a case from a county court to the High Court if it is felt that the case is of such import that it should be reported in open court. That is the issue surrounding open or closed courts—courts into which the public are allowed or courts into which they are not allowed. 
 The issue of what is reported about court proceedings has been a cause of concern. The reporting of court proceedings can refer to a person—who is allowed to be in court—telling someone else what went on in court; or to media reporting by ordinary reporters who sit in the court with items going into newspapers, magazines and so on; or to reporting of transcripts of judgments given by the higher judiciary, county court or High Court judges in the official law reports. Currently, courts consider what they think should be reported in each individual case, with the default position being no reporting to protect children. Both the county court and High Court have the ability to make judgments public while protecting the anonymity of the child if it is in the public interest to do so. The Bill makes no change to the law on reporting. The law must strike a balance between freedom of information and protection of the privacy of children. We must remember that we are dealing with adoption cases, not the other cases that we discussed this morning. 
 The current drafting of the clause certainly allows room for improvement. We could examine whether there should be an automatic bar on identification in the county courts and High Court to match that in the magistrates courts. I will take the amendments away and consider them. We will decide whether county courts should have the ability to revert to open court, but good reasons would be needed to persuade us firmly. Individuals can still go to open court through the High Court, and if necessary transfer from county court to High Court. We might be able to tighten up the clause by writing in the issue of anonymity. I hope that those assurances will persuade the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) to withdraw his amendment.

Tim Loughton: I, too, welcome you back to our deliberations, Mr. Stevenson. You missed some interesting discussions this morning, and we appear to be making swifter progress.
 I feel rather guilty because I accused the Minister of being slightly disappointing in her earlier responses, and she obviously took it to heart. After the benefits of reflection and a good lunch, she has returned and responded obligingly, seriously addressing several of our points. The point about dealing with civil courts was a fair one. Proceedings went well before lunch, despite the utterance—twice—of ''anonymised'', which I refuse to accept is a word in the English language, although I understand the drift. Before lunch, the Minister said that there was ''room for improvement'' in drafting of the clause. A few sentences ago, that was upgraded to ''certainly room for improvement'', and she has now offered to take away the amendments and study them, presumably with a view to tabling new ones that will make clause 96 clearer and closer to the best interests of the child. With great pleasure, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 96 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 97 - Officers of the Service

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 150, in page 51, line 35, after 'application', insert
'or by any local authority in whose care the child has at any time been placed.'
 We now come to an interesting clause that deals with officers of the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, which has been a bone of contention in the months since it was set up. The Minister said some interesting things about CAFCASS, but I will leave that my general concerns to debate on amendment No. 136. You may oblige us with a clause stand part debate, Mr. Stevenson, depending on the length of discussion of the clause. 
 The clause deals with the nature of the officer appointed by CAFCASS, or ''the Service'' as it is described in the clause, to act on behalf of the child, the child obviously not being in a position to act for himself. The response from lawyers is that there are many tongue-twisting descriptions of people in the Bill: the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 got rid of the court welfare officer and the guardian ad litem, and lawyers are now faced with calling the relevant individual the ''children and family court reporter'' or the ''children and family court advisory and support service officer'' or the ''officer of the Service'', as described in clause 98. It is not beyond the wit of the Government to propose a snappier title to describe that important person. 
 There needs to be a specific link between the person who acts on behalf of the child in care proceedings and the person who acts in adoption proceedings. The restriction in subsection (2) is that, for understandable reasons, the person appointed should not be employed by the local authority that has made the application. Our amendment would extend that exemption to employees of a local authority that has had care of the child in the past. There is a risk of partiality, however it may be expressed, on the part of someone who has known a child in their capacity as an employee of a local authority that has had charge of that child. The officer of a local authority may also have a view about how the subsequent local authority has dealt with the child, which may make his treatment partial. I am not casting aspersions or suggesting that that is likely to happen, but it would be a sensible safeguard if the Government recognised that employees of a local authority should be exempted if the child has been in the care of that local authority. 
 The same exemption should apply to a local authority that has had more recent care of the child. I do not know whether the Government would want to qualify how recent that care has to have been, but we are open to suggestions in the case of a child with a long-standing record of placement orders. The amendment would simply extend the exemptions under subsection (2)(a).

Rosie Winterton: As the hon. Gentleman says, clause 97(2)(a) prohibits the appointment as CAFCASS officer in a case involving a placement order of a person employed by the local authority that is making the current application. The intention is to prevent conflicts of interest such as a self-employed guardian acting on behalf of a local authority that is involved in a case as well as on behalf of the child. The amendment would extend the category of persons who may not be appointed to include any person employed by any local authority that has ever had the care of the child involved. That would prevent not only current conflicts of interest, but also any suspicion that a children's guardian might be overly influenced by a connection with a local authority that was previously involved in the case.
 One of the purposes of the current Bill is to align practice in adoption and care cases more closely. It is noticeable that a wider restriction applies in care cases than is currently contained in the Bill.

Jonathan Djanogly: I am interested in hearing the Parliamentary Secretary's opinion on a matter related to conflicts of interest. Reading subsection (1)(b), it appears that the same person could act for the child and also act effectively as an adviser to the parents who are giving their consent. Is that not in itself a conflict of interest and does the Bill address that conflict?

Rosie Winterton: There may be instances in which there has been a relationship between the two but I will come back to that point.
 As I was saying, one of the purposes of the Bill is to align practice in adoption and care cases more closely. It is noticeable that a wider restriction applies in care cases than is currently contained in the Bill. Rule 4.10 (7) of the family proceedings rules prohibits the appointment as guardian ad litem of anyone who has been employed by a local authority and involved in arrangements for the child during the previous five years. If there was any conflict of interest, as in the case that the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) raises, that person would not be allowed to act in any way. The role of the guardian ad litem is to protect the interests of the child; therefore, if a person were acting for any other party, there would be a conflict, and that would be ruled out.

Jonathan Djanogly: For clarification, is the Parliamentary Secretary saying that the conflict would be ruled out somewhere in the Bill, or under another piece of legislation? She mentioned guardians ad litem but I thought there were no such things anymore.

Rosie Winterton: I am sorry—I am using out-of-date language. There is usually no need for a children's guardian in a case where the parent agrees to the adoption. In such cases there would be a reporting officer to the court as opposed to the child's interests being separately represented by a guardian; the whole issue would be dealt with by a reporting officer. In some cases the children's guardian will also report on the child's interests: if the children's guardian perceives a conflict of interest a different officer will be appointed.
 The amendment goes too far in excluding anyone connected with a local authority that was previously involved in the case, however remote that period and whether or not that individual has ever had any personal connection with the case. However, I am certainly not unsympathetic in principle to the amendment. If the hon. Gentleman agrees to withdraw it, I undertake to consider the matter further to establish whether tightening up the provision to bring it more into line with other provisions is possible. If that is deemed appropriate after consultation, the Government will table an amendment at a later stage.

Tim Loughton: I am on a roll: that is two hits, and with the next amendment standing in my name, I might be ambitious and go for a hat trick. Before in-flight refuelling, the Minister said that the amendment would place impossible limits on anyone working in local authorities. That is why I added the caveat that the Minister might like to reconsider the matter in the light of a time exemption or restriction to a certain number of authorities. My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon raised further important considerations about potential conflicts. The Minister has promised to look again and she is ''certainly not unsympathetic''—a positive statement in a negative sort of way—so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Elfyn Llwyd: I beg to move amendment No. 136, in page 52, line 9, at end insert—
'(5) The Service shall lay an annual report before Parliament dealing with its performance, staffing and all matters relating to the exercise of the functions bestowed upon it by this Act.'.
 CAFCASS is one of the most important aspects of the Bill. If the Bill is to succeed, the service must succeed. Over the weekend I discussed the issue with a senior circuit judge in north Wales, a family court judge. He was genuinely fearful of the headlong rush to set up CAFCASS and he condemned the treatment of the guardians—whether ad litem as was, or children's as now. A time bomb could be lying in the Bill. If the service fails, the Bill fails: it is as simple and obvious as that. 
 Guardians ad litem were introduced to provide fully independent people to protect the interests of children. They fulfilled that role through the provision of detached, objective assessments and expert advice on child care matters to the courts. That has been the position since 1984. As a practitioner, I know how heavily lawyers and the courts depend on their independence and expertise. They are clearly a core service in the whole scenario. 
 It is sometimes said, ''Why try to repair what has not been broken?'' An allied problem is whether to bring the official solicitor, the guardians and court welfare officers together under one roof. That potentially poses a great conflict of interests, to which the Minister referred earlier. They have wholly different functions, yet now fall under one particular roof. Nothing is more likely to ensure the Bill's success than the guardians' independence of mind. We must preserve their expertise and continue to rely on those who have worked in the field over the past few years. 
 We all know that securing the best interests of children must be the driving force in every case. Without the good offices of guardians and the best possible level of advice, we will fail the children. That shows how vital the guardians are. They face considerable pressure because there are too few of them to carry out the necessary work, which can be hard and stressful. They frequently undergo emotional stress. Guardians often have to issue advice that they know will be highly unpopular, but they will always be driven by what is best for the child or young person in all the circumstances. 
 The dispute between guardians and the new service, CAFCASS, has been mentioned. CAFCASS faces three distinct problems: the dispute with children's guardians; the fact that the service is already over budget; and the fact that its chief executive is suspended, which does not augur well. The Minister quite properly mentioned earlier that some of the guardians' difficulties could be overcome through consultation, but their treatment by CAFCASS was improper and unreasonable. CAFCASS is one step removed from the Government, so I am not levelling oblique criticisms at the Minister or the Department. I echo the words of the senior judge to whom I spoke over the weekend in saying that the headlong rush to CAFCASS might well prove to be a mistake. We shall have to reflect at leisure later. Because we are dealing with the lives of children and young people, it may, unfortunately, have far-reaching consequences. 
 The Parliamentary Secretary will know that, over summer last year, CAFCASS decided to ensure that all guardians under its auspices were employed by the service. Most, if not all, experienced guardians had been self-employed and many would tell the Committee that that was one of the safeguards of their independence. An application for a judicial review was made to the Family Division of the High Court. Lord Justice Scott Baker came out heavily against CAFCASS for not allowing the guardians a reasonable period to reply to the short consultation initiated. The subsequent exodus of distinguished guardians is the one thing that the service cannot allow. 
 The judge said: 
''The children whom guardians represent are 'among the most vulnerable in society'.''
 The judge emphasised that 
''guardians must be both independent and be seen to be independent, have the authority to be able to make often unwelcome recommendations, and be able to withstand pressure from Local Authorities and other parties. Therefore the impending loss of vast numbers of experienced guardians was 'a serious position, which needs to be remedied quickly.' ''
 He went on to say that 
''the present dispute is entirely unhelpful to the Family Justice system.'' 
Those would be strong words in any High Court judgment. He said: 
''The current position has been brought about by CAFCASS because of its conduct, and that of the Project Team before. It is greatly to be hoped that relations could be improved. They will have to be if the service is to fulfil its responsibility to children.''
 The judge went on to say: 
''CAFCASS has alienated the very people it needs, if it is to discharge the responsibilities that Parliament entrusted it with.''
 He criticised CAFCASS 
''among other things, for its poor communication skills, for delays in communicating its decisions to Guardians, and for ignoring his own request that negotiations take place to resolve this issue. The Court cannot tell CAFCASS how to run the service, however much it may fear for the future. Critical decisions on the nature of the service, and how it is funded, are political, and it is at this level that pressure must be brought to bear if the 'impending disaster' . . . is to be averted.''

Meg Munn: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that, under the previous arrangement, difficulties with the quality control of some guardians ad litem were not properly managed and it was difficult to ensure that every guardian was producing the thorough quality of work required? One reason for a more managed and organised service was to deal with some of the previous problems. I am not suggesting that all guardians were of insufficient quality.

Elfyn Llwyd: I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. I agree that some guardians were failing, but alienating more experienced guardians and forcing them to jump out of the service will not help. I agree that problems did exist, as in any service: some delivered well and some fell short of the mark. If experienced guardians are alienated and treated with contempt by CAFCASS, it does a disservice to those doing a good job and, more importantly, to children.

Julian Brazier: The hon. Gentleman develops a powerful case, and describes a classic example of what happens in a powerful bureaucracy where the emphasis is not on improving quality, but on extending a power base by pushing out people over whom it has less control. This morning, when the hon. Gentleman had an important engagement outside the House, we alluded to possible problems in other powerful bureaucracies.

Elfyn Llwyd: The hon. Gentleman is right. I am of the devolving rather than the centralising persuasion.
 To answer the question of the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Ms Munn), another way of dealing with the problem would have been to ensure better training of those of who fall short. Management is necessary, but imposing a huge top-down structure is not the best way to achieve that, which is why I welcome the debate. I do not profess to know all the answers, but I have identified some of the problems and, more importantly, the High Court has also done so recently. 
 One has to ask how we are to view the fact that the new court advisory service is found to be acting unlawfully within months of its creation and alienating those with whom it is supposed to be working. We also have to ask to what extent CAFCASS is publicly accountable for its actions. What is to be made of it defending itself by arguing that it is not bound by the promises of its predecessor or by the statement by the Lord Chancellor in a written answer to the right hon. Member for South-West Surrey (Virginia Bottomley)? 
 What we have here is the possibility of a quango, which will suddenly run wild. It is unpardonable for a service to say that, regardless of what the Lord Chancellor's Department has said, it is not bound by that and that it is a free-standing body which will do exactly as it pleases. CAFCASS has run into trouble with the High Court within months of its inception. 
 The argument was that CAFCASS was a non-departmental public body—

Julian Brazier: I saw several hon. Members shaking their heads. Will the hon. Member confirm that it was actually part of the testimony by CAFCASS that it did not regard itself bound by clear pledges made by the Lord Chancellor's Department and, indeed, was openly breaking them?

Elfyn Llwyd: The hon. Gentleman has jumped ahead of me. I was getting to that point.
 The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I am indebted to him for much of the information that I am relying on today. CAFCASS argued that, being a non-departmental public body, it was therefore independent of the Lord Chancellor's Department and the project team and, accordingly, was not bound by any statements made apparently on CAFCASS's behalf. It further argued that guardians should have known that and accordingly should have set no store by any of the comments or promises made by the Lord Chancellor's Department. The learned judge was very unimpressed by that argument and cited CAFCASS's own statements to guardians that the Lord Chancellor had the final say on the contracts to be offered to guardians. 
 It is obviously worrying to anyone who has concern for parliamentary democracy that a public body should take the view that the Lord Chancellor's promises to Members of Parliament on its behalf places no obligations on it. What, then, is the point of Members of Parliament writing to the Lord Chancellor and the Ministers concerned if bodies such as CAFCASS consider themselves unfettered by the response? I am sure that, in due course, the Parliamentary Secretary will wish to say a word or two about that. 
 I realise that I have dealt at length with this dispute. It does not fill me with any confidence, and I go back to where I started briefly in speaking to the amendment: the service must succeed if the Bill is to succeed. I know that the Parliamentary Secretary is most sincere in her calling and that she will do her best. What we need to do is ensure that there are plenty of good guardians available, that they will remain independent and that they will be given employment opportunities that befit their status. If that happens, there will be no problem recruiting good-quality staff for the future. If it does not happen, this legislation will cave in and we will all have wasted a great deal of time and, worse, lost a great opportunity.

Hilton Dawson: I share many of the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd). He clearly speaks with great knowledge, and from considerable experience. However, he has been a little negative, although I acknowledge the problems. I refer him to an early-day motion, which I submitted many weeks ago now on this subject—I would not be surprised if he had signed it.
 The whole discussion about whether or not CAFCASS is responsible to the Lord Chancellor's Department is rendered somewhat academic by the way that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary has responded to the concerns of hon. Members on both sides of the House over CAFCASS. I have had several constructive meetings with her about those concerns. 
 The important thing is that the principle of what the Government set out in the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 for the future of a unified service, bringing together guardians ad litem, the court welfare service and the official solicitor, is absolutely right. This vital service, which offers representation, advice to courts, support to children and young people facing difficult situations in court and in their family lives, is of fundamental importance. 
 The new structure offers an opportunity for a well-managed service; it offers people opportunities for career progression through all levels of a service, which operates in different ways and in different contexts; and it offers an opportunity for excellent training and professional development. It must be the way forward for the sort of modernised service that we want to see, offering something important to vulnerable people. 
 CAFCASS has had a bad and difficult start. I doubt that anybody would deny that, but I hope that the situation has moved on from what it was, even those few weeks ago, and from the description outlined by the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy. CAFCASS has a positive future. The Government have not only attended to setting it up in the proper way through the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 but are clearly acting in the best interests of children when they give great attention to the difficulties that the service is experiencing and to the best way to make it work. 
 I am confident that the structure that we have, which is much better than the hybrid relationships that we have had in the past, will work well to the benefit of children and young people.

Tim Loughton: I was interested in the opening comments of the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson). He described the contribution of the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy as a little negative, but the hon. Gentleman has done the Committee a great service because he has ingeniously tabled a useful amendment, which has given the Committee the opportunity to debate the problems with CAFCASS and to insert a common-sense means of ensuring that the House properly monitors its rehabilitation.
 I was somewhat surprised when the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre described the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy as a little negative, not least because of his early-day motion 282—to which he modestly referred—which was tabled on 22 October and signed by hon. Members from all parties. His motion described CAFCASS as a service ''of crucial importance'', but the language then changed and the motion stated that this House 
''is alarmed to observe that already 24 out of 52 managers of children's guardians have left the service, one of them with the statement that 'CAFCASS nationally is in a state dangerously close to paralysis'; is appalled that a judicial review on 14th September held that CAFCASS has acted unlawfully in withdrawing the option of self-employment for guardians; is extremely concerned that the centralisation of the service will undermine the ability of experienced professional to offer independent support and representation for vulnerable children; and calls on the Government to institute an urgent and fundamental review of the service, taking full account of the views of children and young people, organisations representing them and the dedicated people who work within it.''
 If that is not more than a little negative, I do not know what is. I am not sure how the hon. Gentleman can accuse the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy of being negative. 
 However, I agree wholeheartedly with the other comments of the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre. CAFCASS is in a mess, but I will not go over the points made earlier.

Hilton Dawson: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that I said that the situation has moved on markedly from the day that that early-day motion was tabled and from what was described therein?

Tim Loughton: We remain to be convinced of that and await the Parliamentary Secretary's comments on what remarkable metamorphosis has taken place in the past six weeks, although she did not claim that in response to a question earlier this afternoon. Then, she admitted that the consultation that should have happened in the first place was now taking place, as many hon. Members would agree.
 I spoke to members of a local social services department about the Bill and the problems of CAFCASS. They commented that CAFCASS had shown no sense of commitment in engaging with the guardians. They said also that the Government wanted an employed service and by doing so risked getting inexperienced people from local authorities to take over the positions as a lot of experienced people were in the process of heading out of the door. No doubt training can be provided to bring those people towards a position approaching the experience of their predecessors, but it seems a great loss and an event that could have been avoided with a little more sensitivity from the Lord Chancellor's Department. It is a double blow, because people from local authority social services departments who are desperately needed to deal with other parts of the Bill will now have to make up the shortfall in CAFCASS. 
 We received many submissions on the subject, and I will quote a letter from a children's guardian. She said: 
''As a group of Guardians, we are concerned that we were not fully involved in the consultation process that preceded the inception of Cafcass. We were shocked when we were informed in July that we had two weeks to sign a contract of employment that would effectively mean that we could not undertake our duties to the Courts and children . . . It surely is an inauspicious start for an organisation set up to advise and support the Courts, that within its first few months, it ends up on the wrong side of the judicial process, found to have acted unlawfully in relation to practitioners, whose service it needs to meet its obligations to children. This is hardly likely to inspire confidence in CAFCASS and its practitioners, or in the Family Justice system as a whole. It may not be coincidental that the only member of the Judiciary on the CAFCASS board has now resigned his position . . . To what extent is CAFCASS publicly accountable for its actions? What is to be made of it defending itself by arguing that it is not bound by promises of its predecessor or by statements of the Lord Chancellor to Members of Parliament . . . What is worrying to anyone who has a concern about parliamentary democracy, is that a public body should take the view that the Lord Chancellor's promises to an MP on its behalf, places no obligations upon it''—
 witness the written answer that was quoted earlier. The letter continues: 
''What then is the point of MPs writing to the Lord Chancellor and the ministers concerned, if CAFCASS considers itself unfettered by the response?''
 That is pretty strong stuff from someone who wanted to get on with her job of being a guardian of the court and, to all accounts, did it rather well. She and many of her colleagues are now exceedingly disillusioned. 
 In the New Law Journal this week—it may or may not be hot off the press—an article on CAFCASS by a contributor, Richard White, reinforces the depth of the problems. He says that the chief executive of CAFCASS has taken the rap for the chaos and has been suspended from her post, as the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy said earlier. The Times quoted a probation service official saying 
''She can be quite formidable and has a reputation for leaving a bit of a trail of destruction behind her.''
 The article says that there is a large budget deficit, that start-up costs were high and that CAFCASS had gone backwards since its inception six months ago. CAFCASS is not a happy ship and, as the hon. Gentleman said, if it is not working, large parts of the Bill are doomed to the same fate, which will not be good for any of the people whom we are discussing. It is vital that the Bill is well financed and that the mechanisms and the processes of the law can be carried out by the existing systems. In the case of CAFCASS, there is a serious question mark over whether that can be achieved. 
 The hon. Gentleman is not asking for CAFCASS to be disbanded and for the whole edifice to be reconstructed in another guise; he is not asking for heads to roll large scale, or for it to be reorganised. We take comfort from the changes, and from the consultation that is taking place at long last. We remain to be convinced that the metamorphosis has been quite so complete in the past six weeks, and we ask the Minister to respond to the points made by the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre. Amendment No. 136 simply puts a duty on the service to lay before Parliament an annual report on its performance, staffing and matters related to the functions that the Bill bestows upon it. That sounds sensible to me, even without CAFCASS's problems. Given those problems, it sounds particularly sensible. 
 This morning, I drew analogies with the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which set up a new, powerful organisation to regulate the large and important financial services industry, because adoption is a large and important subject. There are safeguards within the FSA, although many of us thought that it had been given too much power. A reporting mechanism to the Chancellor, to Parliament and to other bodies in the House was identified but we would like it to have been clearer. Clear reporting mechanisms have been identified. It seems strange that the Bill should not automatically place on the service that is essential to the adoption functions that we are trying to institute a requirement to report its progress or lack of progress and its record to date to Parliament each year. 
 The Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee reports annually, I believe, to the Treasury Select Committee. We set up reporting mechanisms for other important institutions, so it is only sensible that we should place a requirement on CAFCASS to lay an annual report before Parliament. It should not be provided unofficially to the Lord Chancellor's Department, with no publication requirement. The report should be no holds barred, with nothing taken out and nothing kept secret. 
 Surely it is right that we in this place should have the opportunity to debate such a report, especially if there are serious shortcomings in it. Producing an annual report and laying it before Parliament would give the House an opportunity to debate it if it saw fit to do so. Currently, CAFCASS is not required to report on the progress that it has made, certainly as regards its obligations and requirements in the Bill. 
 It would be wholly reasonable for CAFCASS to have to produce such a report; that would not be an enormous burden on the service. I am sure that the Lord Chancellor's Department requires it to report on progress in any case, so it is only right that the whole House should have the opportunity to judge whether that progress is sufficiently swift and substantial. An annual report to the House would be by far the best way of providing such an opportunity. On that basis, I very much hope that we can score a hat trick and that the Minister will agree that this reasonable amendment is needed.

George Stevenson: Before the Parliamentary Secretary responds, I should point out that this has been a pretty wide-ranging debate. Only when the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham spoke was the term ''annual report'' mentioned twice. No other Member mentioned such a report, although it was the subject of the amendment. I allowed that because the points made were relevant, but I inform the Parliamentary Secretary that when the clause stand part debate is called, I shall be listening carefully for repetition. I hope that hon. Members will assist me in that regard.

Rosie Winterton: I am glad that you said that, Mr. Stevenson.
 Obviously, this has been a wide-ranging debate on the amendment. I understand hon. Members' concerns about CAFCASS, but the principle of bringing services together is right. That goes back to points made by my hon. Friends the Members for Lancaster and Wyre and for Sheffield, Heeley. Consultation carried out before the formation of CAFCASS pointed firmly in that direction. 
 I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley made a point about the advantages of being able to manage one service. We can bring together best practice, institute training that applies in all regions and bring in the benefits of information technology. Running a proper service that focuses on children is an important principle, in which most children's guardians, as well as many other professionals in the field, believe. We should accept that, and I am glad that the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy began by saying that he felt that that was probably the right way to go. It is important to ensure that the service works. It would be foolish of me to say that CAFCASS has had an easy first eight months. It has not, but we must remember that during that time it has brought together 114 separate local arrangements. At the same time, it has continued to provide existing services and to build up the new national service. 
 There is also no doubt that the continuing dispute with self-employed guardians has taken up much of the management's and board's time. It would be foolish not to admit that. The management and the board have some difficult decisions to make. I hope that the hon. Gentleman is aware that some difficulties have arisen because of the previous arrangements in which self-employed guardians could be employed by several different local authorities and work on an hourly basis. 
 There were strong indications that, when the service was brought together and there was, in effect, one employer, that would prove difficult. The hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy is right in saying that that dispute, which to an extent is still unresolved, has dogged the first eight months. I hope that he will also recognise that, following the judicial review, the Lord Chancellor gave a statutory direction to CAFCASS to start consultation on the option of self-employment for guardians on 10 October. 
 That consultation will continue, and I may reassure the hon. Gentleman if I give some idea of how that will work. Self-employed guardians will have received a letter that invites their views on self-employment. CAFCASS has also accepted the proposals made by NAGALRO, which, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman knows, is the National Association of Guardians Ad Litem and Reporting Officers. NAGALRO proposes that an independent facilitator chair the consultation. That facilitator has been agreed, meetings have already taken place and more meetings have been diaried to ensure that the process keeps moving. The results of the consultation will be independently assessed. That has also been agreed with NAGALRO. 
 It must be restated that CAFCASS must reach an agreement that will meet Inland Revenue requirements, and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise. It is also important to stress that there are many employed guardians who would feel strongly if there were any suggestion that they had not acted independently or in the best interests of children because of their employment status. I urge hon. Members to bear that in mind when they consider whether children's guardians can continue to be independent if they are employed. We must remember that self-employed and other guardians were appointed by local authority panels. They may later have had to represent the children in situations of conflict with the local authority. In future, whether employed or self-employed, they will be given cases by a completely independent body. That is an important principle. As I said, employed guardians might have had strong feelings in the past about indications that they had not done their job properly; that should not happen in the future. Those committed people have worked in the best interests of children and will do so in the future, no matter what their employment status is. 
 I regularly meet the chairman of CAFCASS and receive weekly progress reports from him. I assure members of the Committee that we are determined to make the service work. We are convinced that it is the right answer and that it will be in the best interests of children. It is easy to look at past problems, but we want to look to the future. We are working closely with the board, and the management and board of CAFCASS are consulting the self-employed guardians. We must do all that we can to assist in developing a service that goes forward.

Elfyn Llwyd: I am grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for her considered, useful and comprehensive reply. Bearing in mind that several non-departmental public bodies lay their reports before Parliament annually, what is the objection, if any, to that pattern in this case? Government and Opposition Members all want the same result.

Rosie Winterton: The hon. Gentleman is hurrying me along to his amendment, but I am trying to set out the background and answer his earlier questions. I shall address the issue of the annual report but first wish to provide further assurances.
 In addition to accountability through the board to the Lord Chancellor's Department, the magistrates courts service inspectorate carries out an independent inspection of CAFCASS. The hon. Gentleman may have heard about that on Second Reading, but I repeat it here for the record. The inspection includes visits to all parts of CAFCASS; this week, the inspectorate is visiting the headquarters. I hope that some of its findings will reassure the hon. Gentleman that services are generally being delivered. The preliminary report of the inspectorate has said that, in visits made so far, CAFCASS has generally continued to deliver at least the same quantity and quality of services to children, families and courts as were provided by the previous services before CAFCASS was established in April 2001. 
 I will not pretend that the report did not draw attention to the difficulties that occurred as a result of the judicial review. We all recognise that the review caused problems, but it is important for us to have the reassurance that, due to the professionalism and dedication of those who work in CAFCASS, service delivery has generally been of at least the same standard as previously.

Elfyn Llwyd: When did MCSI first become involved?

Rosie Winterton: MCSI was involved from the very beginning as part of its duties under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000.

Elfyn Llwyd: But how can MSCI say that the service is as good as it used to be if it did not exist then?

Rosie Winterton: Because of the way the inspectorate carries out its duties, it will have regard to the relationship CAFCASS has with local authorities. Any complaints that the service was of a lesser standard would be drawn to the inspectorate's attention. One of the difficulties in monitoring some cases—unallocated work, for example—is that previously there was no check, and no figures on the previous position are available centrally, because some 114 different services were brought together.
 I hope that the hon. Gentleman is reassured by the fact that, as well as the annual report, there is an independent inspection. Those inspectors have right of entry to CAFCASS premises, and the right to inspect any CAFCASS documents. The Lord Chancellor can also direct the MCSI to inspect specific issues or functions of CAFCASS. It may provide the hon. Gentleman with even more reassurance to know that statute requires the chief inspector to make an annual report to the Lord Chancellor, which must be laid before Parliament, so in a sense an independent inspectorate has already laid a report before Parliament. 
 On the amendment and the idea of submitting a separate annual report to Parliament on the exercise of the functions of adoptions, I am afraid that I shall have to disappoint the hon. Gentleman. His amendment is not necessary because paragraph (12) of schedule 2 to the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 states: 
''The Service must make a report to the Lord Chancellor in respect of each financial year on the performance of its functions.''
 The Lord Chancellor may give directions on 
''the information to be given in the report and the form in which it is to be given, and . . . the time by which the report is to be given.''
 He must 
''lay a copy of the report before each House of Parliament''
 and 
''arrange for the report to be published in a manner he considers appropriate.''
 That provides the opportunity for Parliament to consider how CAFCASS has exercised all of its functions.

Tim Loughton: The Minister is stating material evidence in response to an amendment that was moved about 40 minutes ago. She said that the report would be laid in a manner that the Lord Chancellor deemed appropriate, which opens up different avenues of what it will look like. Will she reassure the Committee about the report's contents and thoroughness on the adoption procedures in the Bill, which is the point of the amendment?

Rosie Winterton: Yes.

Tim Loughton: Good.

Rosie Winterton: I thought that the hon. Gentleman might ask that.
 I should finish my previous point. The report will provide an opportunity for Parliament to consider how CAFCASS exercised all of its functions in supporting children, and not only those functions relating to adoption. The report will cover not only CAFCASS's activities, but those of any corporate bodies under its control, and will be submitted by 30 June, following the end of the financial year. Specifically, it will review CAFCASS's performance in the preceding financial year and provide appropriate comparable outturns for previous years. It will report on how CAFCASS has exercised its functions and met its duties and objectives as set out in statute, the report and the corporate plan. It will cover also any other matter specified by the Lord Chancellor. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman, and I refer hon. Members to the framework document, which contains all the details. If they find it useful, I am happy to let them have a copy. 
 Section 17 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 provides, as I said earlier, for an independent inspection by the magistrates court service. As a result, the Government believe that proper legislative measures have been taken to ensure that CAFCASS is accountable to Parliament and the Government. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept my argument that the amendment is superfluous because an annual report is already laid before Parliament. I hope that with those reassurances, he will feel able to withdraw the amendments.

Elfyn Llwyd: That is the longest time that I have heard a Minister take to say the word ''otiose''. I am grateful for the care with which the Parliamentary Secretary has considered the subject. It is important, and she has considered it as such. I am greatly reassured, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

George Stevenson: Before we turn to the clause stand part debate, I repeat my request; no repetition, please.
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: I shall try not to be repetitious.
 I seek to raise a couple of outstanding queries. In particular, I wish to ask about amendment No. 151, which was not selected, on a technicality. With regard to that, I want to put a question to the Minister, rather than re-table the amendment. In the final part of subsection (2)(b), the omission of a reference to subsection (1)(c) alongside the references to subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b), suggests that it is thought that a single person could not fulfil all three of the functions that are set out in those paragraphs. The missing paragraph—subsection (1)(c)—refers to the performance of ''other prescribed duties.'' I fail to understand why someone should not be able to carry out that function, as well as the other two. I am sure that that is not intended, because circumstances might arise in which the court will want the same person to carry out all three of those functions. 
 Leaving it to delegated legislation to spell out of the assistance that the court may require the officer of the service to give, as set out in subsection (4), also does nothing to update the role of such a person; nor does it guarantee any tie-in between the type of reports that need to be written in cases relating to the Children's Act 1989, and those required for adoption. That merely perpetuates the existing system, without the benefit of a proper title for the person concerned. 
 Those two queries, which relate to the latter part of the clause, do not repeat in any way what we have already heard from the Minister, and I wish her to respond to them.

Rosie Winterton: The debate on the clause has been extremely useful. It has enabled many Committee members to put on record their support for the principle of CAFCASS. It has also given encouragement to the people who work in the service that hon. Members are trying not to undermine but to support what they are doing.
 The hon. Gentleman asked who is to be responsible for what, and I might be able to give him some encouragement, were he to listen to me. We agree that there might be room for clarification with regard to the questions that he raised. We will address the questions to find out whether it is necessary to come back with any further clarification, or even with further amendments, should that be required.

Tim Loughton: I have now scored my hat-trick without having to table my questions in the form of amendments, which is particularly gratifying, and without the Minister feeling compelled to use the terms ''diaried'' or ''anonymised'', as she has done in previous responses. I am grateful to her. My questions referred to genuine points raised by lawyers, and I look forward to her response as to whether the clause needs to be changed.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 97 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 98 - Right of officers of the service to have

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 135, in page 52, line 15, at end insert
'or any other records held by that agency relating to the child which he may regard as relevant to the case.'.
 We are trying to ascertain a specific point with this probing amendment, which would give officers of the service full access to the records that they require. The clause could be interpreted as giving those officers the right to look only at records concerning the child after the moment when twin-track planning for adoption had started and not the right to look at all the records concerning the child when care proceedings were being contemplated or had been launched. If an officer of the service were not involved in the earlier care proceedings, there may be a real difficulty in obtaining all the records necessary to compile a full report. That is the basis of the amendment, to which the Minister can no doubt respond swiftly.

Rosie Winterton: As the hon. Gentleman said, clause 98 clarifies the powers of a CAFCASS officer to examine and take copies of an adoption agency's records relating to a proposed or actual application in respect of the child concerned. Obviously, it is essential to ensure that CAFCASS officers have all the relevant information about a child's circumstances in reporting to the court. Subsections (2) and (3) allow for the admissibility in evidence of a copy of any record that a CAFCASS officer is entitled to examine under the clause in any report to court in the particular proceedings or in evidence in the context of those proceedings.
 I am afraid that I may have to disappoint the hon. Gentleman; the amendment is not necessary, because current provisions already provide for what he proposes. Schedule 2 to the Adoption Rules 1984 prescribes what an adoption agency or local authority must cover in its report. That includes 16 points of information, such as the needs of the child, the suitability of the parents and any historical information relevant to the child's needs. A CAFCASS officer can ask the court for leave to inspect other relevant documents under rule 10.20. That may include prior court proceedings involving the child. Regulation 15 of the Adoption Agencies Regulations 1983 also obliges adoption agencies to disclose information from their records to reporting officers and children's guardians. 
 As Opposition Members will appreciate, one aim of the Bill is to ensure that there is no undue delay in proceedings. It is important that there are safeguards to ensure access to other documents, but it is also important for CAFCASS officers to be able to focus on information that is relevant to the adoption proceedings only.

Henry Bellingham: Is the hon. Lady saying that as a result of the clause some documents may not be accessible? If so, that is a concern.

Rosie Winterton: No. I am saying that if a CAFCASS officer believes that there are other relevant documents, he or she can apply to see them. A safeguard is built in. With that in mind, I hope that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham will agree that the amendment is not necessary, as its purpose is covered by other provisions.

Tim Loughton: I am grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for that. Obviously, I was on too much of a roll, and that has been brought to an abrupt halt. I completely overlooked the reference to schedule 2 of the Adoption Rules 1984 in configuring the amendment, let alone the 16 points that the hon. Lady raised. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment, although I hope that I might be able to catch your eye in the clause stand part debate, Mr. Stevenson.

George Stevenson: That remains to be seen.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill. 
Tim Loughton rose—
Mr. Djanogly rose—

George Stevenson: I call Mr. Djanogly.

Jonathan Djanogly: Thank you, Mr. Stevenson. I was about to give way to my hon. Friend, who is much more senior.
 The explanatory notes for clause 98 indicate that the powers are an extension of existing legislation. It is important that we consider the more general implications of the powers. We have had an interesting debate on the last few clauses, and the points that I wish to make arise from implications in earlier contributions. 
 Do the rules regulating the officers of the service, which are set out in clause 97(1), deal with the confidentiality of the information that they will receive pursuant to clause 98? The question of conflict of interest came up in discussion of an earlier clause. Confidentiality is an important issue in so far as officers who have confidential information and advise the child may also advise the birth parents about giving consent, for example. Have we stipulated that they can use the information for the purposes of advising the child only, and not the birth parent? What would happen if they released information to the birth parents? Does the Bill provide for a penalty if that were done? Clearly, circumstances could be touchy, for want of better words. 
 Furthermore, if an officer of the service receives full information for a placement or a hearing, what information would the other parties to the hearing be entitled to receive? Presumably, it would not be the same level of information, although that raises the question of the implications in respect of the Human Rights Act 1998, where disequality of the receipt of information—[Hon. Members: ''Disequality?''] I am sorry; I mean inequality in the provision of information may give rights to one side—the birth parents—to have a claim, perhaps under the Human Rights Act. It may be preferable for the proposal to set out not only what the officers of service are entitled to receive, but also what other people are entitled to receive so that it can be seen that that has been considered. There are a few technical points that should at least be considered in the context of the clause.

Henry Bellingham: Will the Minister clarify one or two points? Clause 98(1) on page 52, in line 12 states ''at all reasonable times''. When might the times not be reasonable?
 Subsection (2) is about records, a matter that we shall discuss in another clause, but which I want to flag up now. I want to ask the Minister if there is an obligation on agencies to keep all records, and how long the obligation lasts. Will the agencies have to keep the records in perpetuity? What will happen if, for example, the agency is taken over or goes out of business, or if the people running it retire? What obligations are there on the successor agency? Perhaps the Minister will let me know. 
 Subsection (2)(a) refers to the proceedings in question and subsection (2)(b) to the evidence in the proceedings. What sorts of proceedings are referred to? Perhaps the Minister will outline the categories or types of proceedings. 
 Clause 98(3) states: 
''which would otherwise prevent the record in question being admissible in evidence.''
 What circumstances are being referred to? I hope that the Minister will be able to enlighten me on those points. My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham may want to make a few remarks.

George Stevenson: That may be the case, but it depends on whether time permits. The Minister had some difficulty hearing what was just said. I hope that she caught every point that the hon. Gentleman made.

Tim Loughton: I am glad to have caught your eye, Mr. Stevenson. I have a couple of queries about the clause—especially about subsection (2)—that were not covered by our earlier amendment. Subsection (2) appears to require the officer of the service to take a copy of adoption agency records, usually for social services files, in order to rely on such records as evidence. For all practical purposes, that is likely to lead to a mountain of additional paper, since the old guardian ad litem's report would usually be a concise distillation of a vast mass of paper contained in files and would be challenged only in a few specific areas. On crucial matters, original records will need to be consulted in any event, and to require the officer of the service to take copies on the off chance that they might need to be produced in proceedings would be profoundly wasteful, using a large number of trees that could otherwise be saved.
 That practical concern brings me to the use of electronic evidence and records. In refuting my amendment to subsection (1), the Parliamentary Secretary referred to the adoption laws of 1984, which are still applied many years later. However, in 1984, the use of e-mail and electronic records was comparatively sparse. Is the Parliamentary Secretary satisfied that computer records are fully covered by the descriptions of evidence in the clauses? If not, the evidence will be full of gaps. Records are increasingly likely to be committed to electronic form in any case. Doubtless the Department is aware of the problem, but we would like to be reassured that it will not lead to problems in court.

Rosie Winterton: This has been a fascinating clause stand part debate, in which many detailed points have emerged.
 I should like to start with the comments of hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham), who was not present this morning. Herewith is the lesson of the day on how long agency records can be kept: 75 years. What would happen if an adoption agency became defunct? Regulation 14 states that records must be kept for 75 years. Under further measures, records must be transferred to another agency or a local authority. Information about where those records have been transferred and where they are being maintained must be passed on; the same provision as in clause 53(3) and clause 9. 
 We debated what constitutes reasonable time to examine and take copies of records. The provision is intended to ensure that unreasonable demands are not made on local authorities or adoption agencies in pursuit of their duties. If my interpretation is incorrect, I shall rectify it later. Current adoption rules provide that all information is confidential. The relevant officers of CAFCASS are likely to be a children's guardian or a reporting officer; two different hats that can be worn. One CAFCASS officer can carry out the role providing that there is no conflict of interest. 
 Provisions on the copying of records are permissive; it is allowed rather than required. That touches on the earlier point, mentioned by the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham, about the extent to which people would have access to everything. 
 We have not ruled out the possibility of storing documents electronically, but it is clear that adoption cases are highly sensitive and confidential, so we need to be satisfied that the chosen method is safe and secure. As part of the Government's modernisation of public services, my Department is reviewing all primary and secondary legislation relating to the court process in order to gauge the potential for greater use of e-mail and other electronic means of communication. I should again stress that we must first be completely satisfied about the question of confidentiality in these very sensitive proceedings. 
 I hope that I have dealt with most of the points that were raised, and I commend the clause to the Committee. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 98 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 99 - Evidence of consent

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: Although we have tabled no formal amendments to the clause, I should like to comment briefly on it and ask one small question of the Minister. Subsection (2) allows for the possibility of proving to the contrary in the witnessing of documents. It seems curious that subsection (1) does not make similar provision in relation to the far more serious question of whether a person has given consent to such proceedings. Will the Minister deal with that apparent anomaly?

Rosie Winterton: Perhaps I should first give some background to the clause. It provides that a document signifying consent, which, according to part I of the Bill, must be witnessed in accordance with rules, is admissible as evidence without further proof of the signature of the person who gave such consent. It also provides that, unless proved to the contrary, a document signifying any witnessed consent is presumed to be so witnessed, and to have been executed on the date and at the place specified in the document.
 The provision is intended to ensure that people are not asked to attend court and give evidence about their consent where it has been provided in the standard form. The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham will recognise that the provision is designed to minimise any distress to birth parents that attending court might cause. The provision is fairly standard and is in fact included in the Adoption Act 1976. According to the provision, people will not have to offer further proof of the document in question. However, I can perhaps reassure the hon. Gentleman by pointing out that the provision will not prevent such a person from attending court to say that they did not sign. It merely states that it is acceptable for such a person not to attend court and not to provide further proof of signature. 
 I hope that I have dealt with the hon. Gentleman's points, and I commend the clause to the Committee. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104 - Avoiding delay

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 141, in page 54, line 8, leave out from '(2))—' to end of line 17 and insert—
'(a) draw up a timetable with a view to disposing of the application without delay; and 
 (b) give such directions as it considers appropriate for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that that timetable is adhered to. 
 (2) Rules of court may— 
 (a) specify periods within which specified steps must be taken in relation to such proceedings; and 
 (b) make other provision with respect to such proceedings for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that they are disposed of without delay.'.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendments Nos. 152, in page 54, line 10, leave out 'without delay' and insert 'within 28 days'.
 No. 153, in page 54, line 13, leave out 'may'. 
 No. 154, in page 54, line 14, leave out from '(a)' to 'and' in line 15 and insert 
'will state that any prescribed steps which must be taken in relation to such proceedings must commence within 60 days'.
 No. 155, in page 54, line 16, after '(b)', insert 'may'.

Tim Loughton: The amendments relate to a very important part of the Bill dealing with the whole question of avoiding delay; a term that has featured large in our deliberations since we debated clause 1. Together with the paramount considerations for the welfare of the child, the question of delay is an important consideration on which the whole Bill is based, and we wholly concur with that. It is imperative that we define delay as closely as possible, giving clear guidance to practitioners as to what constitutes delay. ''Without delay'' is a very open-ended term that can be interpreted in a whole host of different ways by legal practitioners and other professionals dealing with adoption.
 On amendment No. 141, members of the Committee will recall that we have been concerned throughout our proceedings to reduce the possibility of anomalies between the Bill and the Children Act 1989. The consequence of not doing so is that lawyers in court or parents arguing against an adoption agency will be able to pick and choose between the welfare checklist in the 1989 Act, as opposed to the rather different welfare checklist in the Bill. That can only delay proceedings and not provide for a clear resolution of the future care of the child. The amendment would redraft subsections (1) and (2), using exactly the same language as section 32 of the Children Act. I know that the Minister will say that the Act does not deal specifically with adoption, but it deals with very similar considerations regarding timetables and delay. 
 Amendment No. 152 addresses the need to put some closer definitions in the Bill. The clause refers merely to drawing up a timetable ''without delay'', which can be open to all sorts of interpretations. The amendment would replace that with ''within 28 days''. We are pleased that the Government appreciate the need for a timetable so that everybody who is party to the adoption knows exactly the time frame in which they are working. If that is not adhered to, due complaint and representations can be made. The amendment would require that the timetable should be drawn up within 28 days. 
 Amendment No. 153, which is contingent on amendment No. 155, would omit the word ''may'', which is a word that we never like to see in Bills in any case. The clause says that rules may 
''prescribe periods in which prescribed steps must be taken in relation to such proceedings''
 and then says that rules ''may'' make other provisions with respect to such proceedings, those two are a pair. 
 In amendment No. 154 we have talked about timetables for when various steps should take place along the adoption track. As the Bill stands, there is no provision for when that timetable should start. We are saying that the clock should start ticking within 60 days of the start of proceedings. These are very closely linked, if slightly confusing, amendments—the bottom line of which is to give some more detailed substance to what delay means and how we can avoid it. 
 I mentioned that the clause mirrors section 32 of the Children Act 1989, but not exactly; that is what we are trying to rectify. That section provided that rules could be made specifying time periods within which steps in care proceedings must be commenced. No rules have been made under that provision, so the courts—while paying lip service to the principle of reducing delay—have not been under specific time constraints. There is therefore no reason to suppose that any rules will be made under clause 104 either. 
 Rather quaintly, explanatory note 222, on page 53 of the explanatory notes fails to appreciate this point altogether. It rather glibly states: 
''Clause 104 is a new provision similar to section 11 of the Children Act 1989 that is intended to avoid delay in the court process. It imposes an obligation on the court, where it is dealing with any matter where the issue of whether a placement or adoption order should be made may arise, to draw up a timetable and give directions that are necessary to ensure that that timetable is adhered to.''
 One can only say that clause 104, as drafted, does nothing of the sort. Without specific time limits, the concept of purposeful delay would continue to hold sway in the courts and care and adoption proceedings would continue to drag on for years, as they do now. 
 What is needed is a specific provision, giving specific time limits for various steps. We have attempted to provide that—quite crudely, I admit—and have drawn up the figures as they appear reasonable on the face of it. However, we are entirely amenable to the Minister's saying that she agrees with us in principle, but using her own definitions and time scale in the Bill. 
 We are trying to avoid the problem, which happens far too often, of allowing children, particular older children, to get lost in the care system. We have seen that the longer it takes to relocate the child into a new settled, stable and caring family, the more likely the damage on that child, particularly at a younger age. The amendments are a perfectly reasonable attempt to avoid the process being strung out even more by expensive lawyers arguing the toss over what constitutes delay. Certainly the experience of the Children Act 1989 has shown that arguing over that definition has wasted a lot of time. The timetables have not been properly instituted. We are attempting to remedy the problems of that Act which we do not want to be replicated in the Bill.

Henry Bellingham: Thank you, Mr. Stevenson, for allowing me to comment briefly on the amendments.
 My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham said that the amendments were a crude attempt to improve things. He does himself down; the amendments have been very well drafted and are well worthy of acceptance. I certainly endorse what he says about trying to avoid delay. That is the essence of the Bill. I draw hon. Members' attention to some of the evidence that has been submitted to the Committee. For example, the memorandum from—ASIST—Adoption Support in Society Today is interesting and well worth reading. It states in column 372 of the other memorandums and letters: 
''One of ASIST's main concerns centres on clauses in the Bill which could hinder the implementation of its aims. It states in the introduction to the Bill 'Any delay is likely to prejudice the child's welfare' ''.{**W4**} 
It refers specifically to the clause, and whether it could be improved. 
 In other evidence, the Law Society says that it is crucial to avoid delay. It notes clauses 1(3) and 104, which cover that point, and adds: 
''We would be particularly interested to contribute to consultation on case management rules.''{**W4**} 
I hope that the Minister takes that into account and examines case management rules. 
 I agree with my hon. Friend that the clause needs more teeth and more focus; it must be more precise. Otherwise, we could end up in a lawyers' paradise. If I may say so without sounding patronising, the Minister answered our technical questions very well. In the Committee's spirit of good will, I hope that she will conclude that our amendments have more substance, more bite, and are better worded than the clause. If she will not accept them today, will she reconsider the clause and return to it on Report, or in the other place?

Jonathan Djanogly: I concur with the opinions of my hon. Friends the Members for East Worthing and Shoreham and for North-West Norfolk. The clause is imprecisely drafted. The scope for a lawyer to argue about what it means is immense, and tightening it could save much time in the courts. I support the periods set out in the amendments.
 I have some further concerns. For the clause to kick into play, proceedings for an adoption order or placement order must take place. In the early stages, a child may have been on the adoption register for about six months. If that child is mature and wants to be adopted, he may not like the fact that he has been left on the register. He may feel that the local authority is not doing what it should to ensure his adoption. If an authority has not done what it should, how can children ensure that a judge insists on drawing up a timetable and instructing the authority to do x or y? Such provision seems to be missing. It may appear in a different guise elsewhere in the Bill. Will the Minister elaborate? 
 Similarly, it is correct to mention the position of prospective adoptive parents. If they have been approved, they may feel that they have not been given access to a child whom they believe to be suitable, or that the pre-placement order process is not being pursued speedily. What remedies would they have to speed up the process? 
 These are more general issues around the specifics of the clause. The way in which the clause deals with the orders when people are already in court needs to be tightened up, but needs to be expanded to deal with the situation in which people want to go to court but cannot get off the starting blocks.

Rosie Winterton: I echo the comments of Opposition Members that the clause is important. A major aim of the Bill is to reduce delay, and the court process plays an important part in that. I assure the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk that I will consider the Law Society's comments on case management rules.
 We want to improve the court process and reduce unnecessary delays in adoption. That is why we specifically included in clause 1(3) an obligation on courts and adoption agencies to bear in mind that, in general, any delay in reaching a decision about the adoption of a child is likely to prejudice the child's welfare. If a court needs to consider a placement or adoption order, it will be obliged to draw up a timetable and give any necessary directions to ensure that it is adhered to. The clause will ensure that the courts maintain a tighter control on adoption and placement orders and do not allow drift, to which hon. Members have referred. The Bill will also give a power for rules of court to set out the time scales in which certain processes should take place. 
 Amendment No. 141 would require the court to draw up a timetable to dispose of any application in which an adoption or placement order needs to be made without delay, which is where Opposition Members may want to speed up the process. I appreciate the spirit of the amendments and can see why hon. Members are concerned to ensure that the court process lives up to the expectations in other clauses that it will be speedy. However, there are problems with the amendments. I will run through them and hope that hon. Members will accept that. 
 First, there is a technical problem. Amendment No. 141 refers in proposed subsection (1)(a) to the requirement of a court to draw up a timetable for the disposing of an application, yet no such application is referred to in subsection (1). In addition, the amendment is more limited in its effect than the Bill as currently drafted. For example, the Bill requires the court to fix a timetable in any proceedings in which a question may arise as to whether a placement or adoption order may be made or in any other question with respect to such an order. That means that a timetable must be set not only in relation to disposing of an application, but in relation to all the interlocutory stages that lead up to a final hearing. On that basis, the Bill is stricter on the steps that need to be taken to minimise delay. 
 Amendment No. 152 would require the court to draw up a timetable in any proceedings in which a placement or adoption order may be made within 28 days. The drafting is rather unclear and it could be read as requiring the court to determine whether an adoption or placement order should be made within 28 days. That is impractical. 
 Amendment Nos. 153 and 154 require court rules to prescribe periods within which prescribed steps must be taken. The Bill states that court rules may prescribe such periods. Amendment No. 154 requires prescribed steps to be taken within 60 days, and the current adoption rules usually require steps to be taken as soon as is practical. Amendment No. 155 is consequential, compensating for the proposed deletion of ''may'' in amendment No. 153, so that courts may make other provisions in addition to prescribing time scales. 
 The problem with the amendments is that they highlight the danger of trying to take a prescriptive approach to tackling delay through primary legislation. We intend to consider the appropriate prescribed periods when we come to the preparation of the new rules. We need to look very carefully at what lessons may be learned from the Children Act and the family proceedings rules.

Henry Bellingham: On the point that my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham made about the phraseology ''is intended'', will it be possible, once the Minister has consulted on the terms of the Children Act and looked again at the very points that she has just mentioned, to change the explanatory notes? I would be much happier if the notes said ''will avoid delay'' rather than ''is intended'', which is a little vague.

Rosie Winterton: The difficulty is that it is important to ensure that, although we want to avoid delay, we must not do so at the expense of the child. It might be pushing it too far to say ''will'' because every case is different. That is one problem with such amendments, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman knows given his eight years' experience at the Bar working in family law. It is important not to be too prescriptive.

Elfyn Llwyd: It is helpful to reflect on the way in which the Children Act 1989 unfolded. It gave an impetus to speed matters up by rules of court. The Parliamentary Secretary has responded to the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk about the Law Society, but will she take note of what the Family Law Bar Association and the Solicitors Family Law Association say about the rules? That is not to cut the lawyers in, but to ensure that the provisions are based on sound experience of the Children Act 1989.

Rosie Winterton: Of course. I understand hon. Members' reservations about leaving matters to court rules or regulations, but there are good reasons for not deciding here how those rules should be drawn up. We want to build on the experience of others.

Julian Brazier: To reinforce the point of the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy, when considering the lengthy Family Law Bill, I consistently noticed a contrast between the evidence of the Solicitors Family Law Association, which seemed to reflect the best interest of the families, and that of the Law Society, which seemed to be based on maximisation of lawyers' earnings.

Rosie Winterton: I had better leave hon. Members to fight that one out.
 Amendment No. 152 would require a timetable to be set within 28 days. In some cases, it would be set more quickly, so the amendment would not necessarily reduce delay. We must recognise that a timetable might not best further the welfare of individual children: it might need to be amended to take account of a change in the position on consent, for example. The amendment could cause difficulties in that regard. I am also concerned that it might require the court to determine whether an adoption or placement order should be made within 28 days, which is rather impractical. 
 The court must have enough time to ensure that it has all the requisite information to determine that the proposed course is in the best interests of the child. That includes the preparation of a schedule 2 report, which details the background to the adoption, the needs of the child and the circumstances of prospective adopters. The general thrust is rightly to reduce delay as much as possible, but we should not force proceedings to go too fast, which might not be in the best interests of the child. 
 Amendment No. 154, which would require prescribed steps to be commenced within 60 days, raises a similar problem. It proposes a slower process than current practice. Family proceedings rules allow respondents only 14 days to respond to an application. Requiring a step to be commenced will not necessarily reduce delay if the step is not completed within a reasonable time. 
 Although we want to reduce delays in court processes and we understand the spirit of the amendments, it is better to set out timetables after full consultation. We should also build on the experience of other jurisdictions when introducing rules. I hope that I have given Opposition Members some reassurance about the Government's intentions, and that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham will withdraw the amendment.

Tim Loughton: I am most grateful to the Minister for dealing at length with our probing amendments, which sought to define delay. She said that she appreciated the spirit of them and is mindful of the need to avoid delay; no doubt that approach would apply to the regulations and directions of her Department. I believe that we agree on what we are trying to achieve. I anticipated that she would draw attention to flaws in our proposals and, on that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Julian Brazier: I beg to move amendment No. 137, in page 54, line 17, at end add—
'(3) It shall be the duty of the Lord Chancellor's Department to monitor the proceedings referred to in subsection (1), to keep statistical information on them and to publish a summary of them annually.'.
 The amendment is much more modest than previous ones. It is designed to achieve a similar objective but over a longer time. I should declare a former interest, in that I used to work as a statistician in an economic research department. 
 The Department has gathered many statistics about adoption and children's services. That is thoroughly welcome; it should not be timid about doing so. The testimony from the lawyers who assisted us with the amendments is that many delays in the court system are outside the direct control of the court. There are two main sources of delay: matters in the courtroom that are under the control of the judge or over which he has influence; and other activities, such as the making of reports and assessments, which happen outside the courtroom and over which the judge has little direct control or influence. I do not wish to take a view either way. 
 The argument for this modest little amendment is that collection of the statistics that I propose would produce three benefits. We would be able to test whether the lawyers are right that the bulk of the delay is, in fact, on the periphery of the court rather than in it; that would be interesting. Incidentally, to correct the record, I was supporting the remarks of the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy on consulting lawyers, not challenging them.

Rosie Winterton: When I said that I would leave hon. Members to fight it out, I meant the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, who had been advocating the Law Society's case.

Julian Brazier: The Minister has caught me out. I assure my hon. Friend that I did not mean in any way to detract from his remarks. I was preoccupied with preparing for the debate.
 The first benefit would be an indication of the overall progress towards the absolutely critical objective of speeding up the court process. Secondly, the statistics would enable us, in the medium term, to determine whether the bulk of the delays are occurring in the court or around the periphery of it, as many lawyers allege. Thirdly, as a pattern developed, we would be able to determine to what extent courtroom delays occurred under particular judges. It would be odious to cite names; however, some former family lawyers have their own private league tables. In parallel, the patterns would show which of the various delays outside the court could be associated with particular local authorities. I shall sit down now to enable the Minister to reply in the time available.

Rosie Winterton: I am afraid that we shall resist the amendment, but I want to say two things before we finish. As the hon. Gentleman said, judicial statistics are kept but at present they record only the number of adoption application orders made. The pilot of specialist centres will enable us to record the time taken in adoption cases, including the length needed for specific tasks, the completion of a CAFCASS officer's report, or a schedule 2 report, for example, although I accept that they relate only to county court proceedings—
 It being Seven o'clock, The Chairman proceeded, pursuant to Sessional Order D [28 June] and the Order of the Committee [27 November], to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair. 
 Question accordingly negatived. 
 The Chairman then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that time. 
 Clauses 104 and 105 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Angela Smith.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at Seven o'clock till Thursday 6 December at half-past Nine o'clock.